sounding a note of urgency. But how is this important communication and interaction to be accomplished? Apparently compelling scientific information very often runs aground almost as soon as it is launched into the choppy waters of public discourse. In statements advocating more and better communication, we often hear language that assumes that the public, with its various circles of decisionmakers, will somehow assimilate scientific information and thus be influenced in its decisions. However, if personal reports are any indication, the experience of many scientists in trying to raise public consciousness about scientific issues has been a mixture of modest success, temptations to overstate, and, in many of the most urgent cases, the sense of one step forward, two steps back.
As communication scholars, we have been interested in both the successes and the missteps in the public fate of scientific information. We sympathize with scientists who wonder what happened to the "objectivity" of their work and question whether it is useful to enter the public fray armed with only their careful methods and modest claims. Is it possible, we have asked, for scientific information to make sense in similar ways for nonscientists and for scientists? We recognize that this question is naive in some respects. It is not at all clear, for one thing, that nonscientists as a group differ very much from scientists as a group in their methods of understanding various sorts of information. Moreover, what does it really mean to gauge intelligibility or understanding "as a group" or to compare such traits to those of other groups? We will leave these questions to others for the time being, but we will address the question posed above in the context of the creation and co-creation of meaning in public discourse.
In answering our question, our lines of reasoning have led us to three conclusions. First, scientists and nonscientists alike would benefit by seeing science communication as a process as well as a product. The communication process inevitably bears two marks of human beings: (1) attempts at mutual influence and (2) a weighing or casting of information as either positive or negative (whether ethically good or bad, useful or not useful, or interesting or not interesting). Second, information is understood through both general and local contexts. Knowledge may be generalizable or universal in its implications, but it is framed through specific contexts that can include such things as regulatory guidelines, media coverage, individual motivation, training, education, and personal experience. For instance, recent studies appear to confirm that, on issues of risk versus benefits, nonexperts' trust of experts is often trumped by the nonexperts' personal experience. The local (direct) knowledge provides a more compelling frame of reference than others' expertise (see, e.g., Siegrist and Cvetkovich 2000) . Third, objectivity is not neutrality. Once an apparently objective body of information is placed in a public context, it will inevitably be evaluated and used to evaluate other information. Not only is this a feature of sensemaking, it is a feature of the communication and weighing processes of science itself.
To illustrate these issues of scientific information and its conveyance, we offer three examples of science communication that involve interactions with nonscientists. The first is drawn from the study of the popular term biodiversity, which began its life with a much more limited and scientifically oriented frame of reference than it acquired in the public arena. Two other examples are drawn from our own work in arranging for scientists to speak with nonscientists about an ongoing project in basic science; the examples show how the same words, apparently common and innocuous, can come to make sense to different groups in quite different ways and how assumptions about what other people must be saying or thinking frame our understanding of the apparent issues being discussed.
Diversity of the term biodiversity
The following example shows the workings of social influences in redefining a scientific term. It suggests that the communication process itself influences the meaning of such a term. Before 1986, concepts such as biological diversity and conservation of ecosystems were reserved primarily for scientific discussions. From the time it was introduced into the scientific lexicon by Walter G. Rosen (Collins and Kephart 1995) and launched into the public arena during the 1986 National Forum on Biodiversity, the term biodiversity has subtly mutated for both scientists and nonscientists.
Its history is documented through an analysis of over 5,000 news stories by Catherine Collins and Susan Kephart in their 1995 article "Science as News: The Emergence and Framing of Biodiversity." The 1986 National Forum planners focused on developing educators' and policymakers' awareness of the transformation of Earth's habitat. Early concepts of biodiversity were rather narrow in application and focused primarily on species depletion and tropical deforestation. According to the forum's brochure, the goal was to awaken the public to the "rapid destruction of Earth's natural habitats and the subsequent loss of plants and animals."
After the 1986 conference, Collins and Kephart say, the term was quickly integrated into the national vocabulary. Indeed, the goal of the conference was to sensitize the public to "the destruction of natural habitats." As the term was adopted and incorporated into a variety of frameworks, its meaning was adapted for a more general use in differing values and perspectives. "Suddenly biodiversity not only held the accumulated wisdom of nature," but determined the future via a capacity for evolutionary adaptation (Collins and Kephart, p. 29) .
As the print and broadcast media picked up the idea, it was associated not only with threatened habitats but also with other issues of species endangerment. In the next several years, a broader definition began to appear in policy-oriented scientific publications. The term now included variability in the genes, species, or ecological assemblages of organisms, as well as in the services they provided to natural ecosystems and to humans. By 1990, the media had picked up the expanded focus and broadened it from scientific considerations even further, in some common cases describing biodiversity as "life... in all its interconnections" and as the primary indicator of healthy ecosystems.
Once the science went mainstream, news writers reduced their reliance on scientists as sources: The number of biodiversity news stories quoting scientists declined from 82% in 1986-1988 to 54% and 44% (respectively) in 1989 and 1990 . Journalists and environmental groups adopted the term for their own uses and goals. Collins and Kephart found the term co-occurring with slogans such as "Earth first." The now-expanded value set implied by biodiversity was presented in court as the source of a proposed legal principle used by environmentalists in California to block timber sales. What was once part of an "objective scientific viewpoint" had been absorbed into a kaleidoscope of frameworks, each with the potential for selecting different elements as useful or salient to its purposes.
Beginning with the National Forum on Biodiversity, scientists made a strategic choice to articulate their concerns about the loss of species and to introduce a concept to stimulate public education and awareness. The media played a key role in taking the interpretation and reconstruction of scientific concepts and turning them into political and social realities. From there, we may be tempted to say, it was a short road to advocacy. However, without advocacy in the various uses of the term, we would be deprived of the different voices needed to build a shared meaning for biodiversity. Advocacy not only can stake out a position, it can also increase the breadth and range of discussion, spark the making of distinctions, and encourage the discovery of related concepts. It is important to note that, from its introduction, the term biodiversity had a value component. During the 1986 forum, scientists began to speak about their concerns over species losses in terms of biodiversity. As soon as concerns surface, so do values."Concerns," after all, simply imply that one end state may be preferable to another.
Case of the surprising fact sheets
In contrast to our first example, which demonstrates ways in which media coverage can reflect long-term and indirect influences on the framing of scientific terms, our second example demonstrates how the lay public may guide its interpretation of scientific information through the social context rather than the underlying science itself (Priest 1995) . It illustrates how personal or social beliefs can affect our reasoning about science and, in particular, how nonscientists' receptivity to scientific ideas might be guided by the community's norms or the social context in which the information is offered. The example comes from a project on bioremediation of radioactive contaminants sponsored by the US Department of Energy (DOE). As part of this project, members of the public were invited to talk to scientists about their current research into bioremediation and the tentative plans for establishing demonstration plots at DOE sites to test the bioremediation of contaminated soil.
One of our first tasks as communication professionals on this project was to convene small focus groups consisting of project scientists and a few interested nonscientists from communities near potential demonstration sites. None of the nonscientists had previously been involved in advisory or public decisionmaking roles on scientific issues, although they lived in an area with a long history of large public projects in science. To prepare the nonscientists, we (project scientists and communications specialists) wrote and designed a set of fact sheets for the major problems and concepts. We wanted to describe the basic principles of bioremediation while providing a clear overview of the scientific and program elements to serve as background for the nonscientists participating in the focus group. We distributed the fact sheets to participants several days before the groups met.
We began each focus group with introductions and some open-ended questions and then asked if anyone had any questions about the information contained in the fact sheets. We were expecting questions about the science or the level of comprehensibility of the information and language. Imagine our chagrin when the participants in the first focus group responded by questioning whether the fact sheets were meant to be informative or persuasive. The information was clear enough, they said, but it was not clear what we intended the fact sheets to be. They were not able to point to anything in particular that raised the red "selling-me-something" flag. The scientists and project staff were adamant that the fact sheets were, indeed,"objective," but the participants seemed, as one observer put it, "unconvinced."
This example illustrates ways in which others evaluate our approaches to them based on standards familiar to them; in public discourse, these may include advertising, political campaigning, previous experience with public involvement activities, arguments in court or in the broadcast media, and other contexts of open or covert advocacy. Thus, even in attempting to establish good working relationships and trust, scientists may be perceived as making a "soft sell" of their knowledge or their interpretation of problems, risks, solutions, and potential outcomes.
Clearly, our scientifically based fact sheets had been placed within an evaluative frame of reference that we might well have rejected as beside the point when we were writing them. The focus group members expressed a chain of thinking that included a "this-is-not-good" statement of value. Reconstructing the chain of reasoning, we speculated that it might have gone something like this:
• You say this fact sheet is A, but I think it looks like B.
• However, despite my impressions, you still deny that it looks like B.
• I trust my impressions.
• You may be trying to manipulate me.
• Manipulation is not good. For the nonscientists in the focus group, the communication context presented at least two conflicting values: the objective and neutral information on bioremediation (how things work and the material facts) versus subtle manipulation in the guise of "simple facts" (Is it meant to induce me to accept a program as a material fact rather than as a policy decision?).
As the focus group participants encountered the fact sheets, they resisted the idea of the objectivity and neutrality of the scientific information. The example demonstrated to us how presumably neutral, objective scientific concepts may be neutral in one frame of reference but not in others. Moreover, objectivity is not, in itself, neutral. We cannot rely on the methods that produced the information to guard it from being placed within a larger frame of reference-for example, a political or a religious frame. The historical frame that encompassed the community where these nonscientists lived included many years of government programs and the uncertainties of past government-sponsored scientific "information, " some of which was widely considered incorrect, self-serving, and unhealthy. We concluded that we had mistakenly ignored the wider frame of reference. How to address such a mistake, however, was not immediately clear.
Complex talk about science
A third example, also drawn from these focus groups, hints at the problem of overlapping frames of reference and the importance of language referents. In a later focus group, the nonscientists raised the question of the practicality of the bioremediation techniques that were being described: How soon would this research be ready for a demonstration project, using actual contaminated soil at an actual site? The scientists responded by speaking about the problems of manipulating desirable bacteria to perform the remediative actions they would like to see before moving the work into the natural environment. They used the term complexity to describe the situation in the natural environment, adding that they thought it was too early to introduce the microbes into the soil.
As eavesdroppers on this conversation, we noted two things. From a scientific point of view, introducing the concept of complexity was probably the right answer to the nonscientists' question,"Why not introduce the bacteria into the natural environment sooner rather than later?" Complexity represents nonlinear relationships, apparently stochastic events, and multiple simultaneous processes with differing time scales and occurrence lengths. The scientists' point was that a 100 × 100 foot plot is probably not well characterized enough to provide a clear picture of what is happening to the bacteria of interest. Consequently, the desirable effects may not be reproducible and the undesirable effects may not be remediable.
However, we also noticed that the term complexity apparently meant almost nothing to the nonscientists. From the evidence of the meeting transcripts, they showed no sign of grasping complexity as an answer to their question. That is, they did not paraphrase or restate the idea, they did not acknowledge the answers (e.g., say "oh" or words to that effect), and they seemed to draw no immediate inference from the scientists' explanations. Instead, they returned to urging that practical applications be found sooner and that workable technologies be created now.
However, the transcripts also show an extended line of reasoning among the nonscientists that did, indeed, require an interpretation of the concept of complexity. The nonscientists apparently associated the concept with properties of the bacteria rather than properties of the medium. After the exchange on complexity, the nonscientists twice restated information supplied earlier by the scientists about the mechanics of bioremediation, in particular that the technique being investigated used the existing, i.e., the native, bacteria from the environment of interest rather than introducing new bacteria. The transcripts show them asking for more information on this process. After the initial information was provided and later confirmed, the nonscientists began a more vigorous recommendation to move the project into a demonstration phase. Their reasoning seemed to be as follows:
• Do you use existing bacteria or introduce new bacteria?
• The approach now uses existing bacteria, native to the environment of interest.
• Because the bacteria are already present in the medium, test the technology in vivo sooner rather than later.
Although the nonscientists had apparently missed the nuances of the term complexity, they seem to have reasoned their way to an application of available information, altering their frame of reference to accommodate the new information.
We can now see that the scientists' and nonscientists' frames of references overlapped, but their positions and perspectives remained distinct and largely mutually misunderstood. After this meeting, one of the scientists commented that the nonscientists seemed uninformed about the way science worked. Note, though, that it would be tempting but wrong to conclude either that the nonscientists were unreceptive to scientific information or that they did not understand the need for controlled experimental conditions.
Dynamic framing
These three examples could be supplemented by many others illustrating the process of communication that takes place as scientific information is placed in a public context. Of the implications that we draw from such episodes, none is more elemental than what they reveal about what the communicators think communication is.
We have noted a disconcerting tendency among scientists and members of the public to see human communication as a transmission process, in which information is conveyed and received. In conversation and dialogue, by this model, the process is simply reversed repeatedly, with the whole sequence of message sending and message receiving resembling an alternating current. In this view, the term communication most aptly refers to an end state rather than to the process-i.e., communication can only be said to occur after something has been received. "Real" communication, presumably, occurs only when whatever has been received resembles what has been sent."False" communication, or "failure to communicate," is the discontinuous end state that resembles a scrambled television signal or data link. It is thus possible to speak rather mysteriously of "noise" between sender and receiver.
For some time, however, human communication theorists have held a different, more complex view (Kellerman 1992 , Craig 1999 . Communication, for them, refers to an ongoing process of sending messages, negotiating the meanings of terms and referents, interpreting messages, and dealing with a variety of responses. It embraces the processes of misunderstandings, automatic mental "scripts," questioning, and cognitive envisioning strategies. The process of communication, then, is both tacit and overt, presentational, and co-created by speakers and listeners. Public discourse particularly reveals the interplay, conflict, and overlap of multiple frames of reference.
Such frames of reference allow us to configure and make sense of information. Erving Goffman defined frames as organizational, classifying, and interpreted acts through which individuals "locate, perceive, identify, and label" (Goffman 1974, p. 21) . Defining frames more as we use them here, Gamson held that facts take on meaning only when they are "embedded in a frame or story line that organizes them and gives some coherence, selecting certain ones to emphasize while ignoring others" (Gamson 1989, p. 157 ). Gamson noted that while frames provide context, they are always interpretations and they are subject to challenges from other viewpoints. For public discourse, the power of framing seems to be that it allows us to characterize information as significant or insignificant, useful or arcane, intelligent or simplistic. Indeed, Edelman (1993) suggested that in a public arena frames can evoke specific and arbitrary ideas about what constitutes reality.
Objectivity in a world full of frames of reference
In the public arena, many voices may be heard with a variety of claims to certainty, credibility, and influence. Framing allows us to select and emphasize, rendering some bits of information more important and others less important. In other words, framing is, among other things, a way of valuing information-that is, placing greater value on some bits and devaluing other bits.
The realization of multiple perspectives (many voices), including the frames of reference of nonscientists, can revise our understanding of objectivity. Nonscientists, we observe, generally have no trouble granting objectivity to scientists (as scientists) if scientists choose to claim it. Certainly, when scientists are acting as scientists, they seek to be as objective as possible, and among the nonscientists we encounter it is commonly thought that scientists probably succeed in being objective, at least more so than people in other walks of life, e.g., the court system. However, discussions of objectivity often attempt to isolate scientific activities from common human processes of judgment, interaction, and interpretation rather than make such activities a special application of common cognitive processes. Two claims about objectivity in particular appear to be misleading and indefensible: that objectivity is an attitude and that objectivity (somehow) is inherently a part of physical reality. If objectivity is primarily an attitude, we could put it on like we put on our clothes in the morning, and its characteristics would change as often. It is possible that most people who claim that objectivity is part of their work may think of themselves as rising to objectivity, much as one pulls oneself together in front of an important client. The argument that objectivity is a part of physical reality may have a basis in fact and experience; however, in doing science, we do not act as though this is true. Scientists do not list objectivity among other items in the "Materials" sections of their articles, e.g.,"40 g objectivity, from XYZ Chemical (0-529-441), traceable to NIST." Nor do they list objectivity as a quality of what they find:"The GIS maps show the lower Sahara region to be 0.15°C cooler than 1 year ago but just as objective." Moreover, apart from the demands of the scientific method and peer review, the objective character of science is not immediately visible to nonscientists, as one might expect a trait of physical reality to be.
Instead, it is in the behavior of scientists doing their work that we first observe the demands of something called objectivity. From an outside perspective, objectivity appears to be a value, associated with the quality of attention that scientists bring to their observations, analyses, and conclusions. By this terminology, objectivity can be both a value, thus a creation of the mind, and an encounter with the objects of scientific attention (the world "out there"). It can be a quality of methods and of the outcomes based on applying those methods conscientiously. It is an indispensable claim to authority in the frame of reference of a scientist. It necessarily involves neither social neutrality nor claims to absolute truth. Many a perspicacious and careful thinker has nonetheless been proven wrong on particular points, however irreproachable may have been the quality of their attention.
By this approach, it is misleading to set up objectivity and subjectivity as polar opposites. Personal (subjective) judgments are an essential part of the careful scientist's quality of attention and prominent in his or her claims to authority. It is noteworthy that the term subjective commonly refers to an overuse of personal impressions and an underuse of the tools useful in establishing an objective frame of reference. It often connotes a self-centered quality of attention and a condition of unawareness of other objects or perspectives. It is a quality of social isolation and thus suggests questionable judgment.
Certainly, scientists spend a great deal of energy on attempting to make their judgments conform to the objects in the world. Thus, object-ivity. As a value, objectivity can be realized to a greater or lesser extent, i.e., our judgments can conform more or less accurately to what we observe (directly or via instrumentation). Primarily, we see scientists painstakingly reaching for objectivity in their methods: limitation of variables; identification of constants; careful measurement of significant variables under controlled conditions (or as controlled as possible); standardization of instrument bases; comparison via parallel or past studies, field versus laboratory studies, or the disciplinary literature to triangulate and thus validate observations; careful and detailed recording methods for both conditions and data; use of analysis tools, e.g., spectrographic or mathematical analysis, shown by experience to render trustworthy and plausible results; writeups designed for reproducibility; peer review; publication in the open literature; and so on. The effectiveness of these tools in realizing objectivity is often convincing. Used with care, they allow us to match our judgments with reality and improve our quality of attention to draw verifiable statements about what we observe.
Of course, we do not need all these tools to be objective. We could simply report on what we see. Nevertheless, we need to be able to open our judgments to a second, third, or fourth opinion. Thus, we appeal finally to multiple perspectives and social confirmation. Being objective, then, is a quality of a frame of reference and a claim of the truth-potential of a set of methods.
Tacit and emergent dimensions
For the most part, then, both scientists and nonscientists participating in public discourse do not emphasize information randomly. They select and emphasize information as a result of at least two primary influences: (1) tacit interests and knowledge and (2) the ideas, agreements, and conflicts that emerge during interactions with others.
Tacit interests and knowledge. Tacit contributions to talk and writing are, by definition, not immediately evident. They extend an invisible hand over the give-and-take in communication and may leave us with little or no information about the other person's assumptions in an interchange.
Social phenomena are associated with tacit elements of communication; that is, they are not simply personal or individualistic. In the 1950s, the chemist and philosopher Michael Polanyi outlined the role that scientists' passions and interests play not only in generating their work but also in framing the work's conclusions, and how neither those outside the work nor the scientists themselves are able to separate the initial passion entirely from the factual outcome. In Polanyi's view, scientists commit themselves to a line of inquiry first as a personal passion or interest in a question or problem. Once the work has matured and the methods and findings seem to be secured, this passion allows what he terms a "confident utterance," and thence a belief in the work as revealing "accredited facts." However, from someone else's perspective (an "outsider" or a nonscientist), the scientist's passion and interest appear to be subjective and personal, and when the scientist makes confident statements about the methods and results, the outsider hears only a declaration ("We have found that..."). Finally, the facts that seem accredited as the outcome of the work are only alleged facts to someone yet to be convinced. A scientist's conviction of the truth of the work may well appear to be subjective to those outside the work, and those who do not share the initial belief, for example, in the compelling nature of the data about the possibility of global warming, will label the accredited facts not objective but subjective (Polanyi 1962, pp. 303-304) .
Moreover, Polanyi noted, the difference between inside and outside viewpoints entails a particular kind of social constraint for the scientist: Even though the process began in a personal commitment to a problem, hypothesis, or topic of inquiry, the verification process used in the scientific method demands that the outcomes be scrutinized skeptically. Polanyi suggests that subjective commitment extends not only through the initial stages of the work but also to the commitment to the findings and the interpretation of those findings. What outsiders, including nonscientists, hear about scientific findings, particularly in science dealing with environmental issues, may often be framed by the immediate problem or experimental question, whereas the scientists' commitments-that is, their frames of reference and the energy that impels them forward-are derived from a field of questions, current concepts, and related problems.
Emergent dimension of frames. For most of us who deal
with the public, values and other tacit types of information are hidden until circumstances bring them out. We can speak, then, of frames of reference emerging during the course of interactions. Because my own frame of reference may be more or less context sensitive, it is revealed, perhaps even to myself, during interactions with others. With more interactions, or upon reflection, I can further establish and clarify my perspective. From others' perspectives, my frames emerge via the patterns formed by my preferred topics, word choice, examples and stories, and responses to immediate contexts.
Although we use these and other sorts of evidence to assume that we grasp the essentials of someone's frame of reference, actually we are making inferences about their perspectives. An interesting exercise is to attempt to list the values that you think someone close to you holds. The safest items in the list may be the most abstract, those professed by most human beings on the planet: kindness, strength, protection and nurturance of the young, and so forth. But in stating more context-dependent values-for instance, willingness to live near potential environmental threats for a higher wage, to leave a higher-paying job for a lower-paying job that helps people more, or to go on a radical cancer prevention diet that means not eating meat-it is harder to answer for someone else (or even to anticipate what your own behavior might be). In practice, we often note the patterns of others' opinions and expressed attitudes in order to picture their probable values in broad strokes. We tend to behave as if attitudes maintained over time, expressed repeatedly, or coinciding with changes in behavior can be treated as values. In considering frames of reference, however, we allow for human inconsistencies and the difficulties in expressing deeply held beliefs. When considering frames of reference, we must allow for partially or incompletely realized values, the consequences of which the holder of those values may not have considered.
Conclusions and recommendations
This article opened with calls from the scientific community for changes in the role of science in society. The note of urgency is clear. However, as this article suggests, the fate of scientific information is a complex matter. In the considerable bodies of literature on risk communication, risk perception, and environmental values, the truest answer we have found to the question of whether meaning for nonscientists can ever be the same as for scientists is "yes, of course, and no, probably not." It is often assumed that if we are more precise, if we target a particular audience more deftly, or if we simply provide more information than we have already, our work can return to its earlier purity, integrity, and objectivity. However, the contexts of public issues and multiple frames of reference place individual findings in a field of influences. Messages become ionized in value fields: Despite what a researcher hopes or intends, compelling data become "alleged facts," qualified statements become "certain," and all become subject to evaluative frames of reference. Others will weigh the information, interpret it according to their interests, and see it as an attempt to influence them or use it to influence others.
Building public trust for expert knowledge or providing better, clearer scientific information will not be enough to allay all fears and overlay all other frames of reference. Differing frames, after all, arise from real differences in power among individuals and between individuals and institutions-in generating and using information, in gaining access to technologies and resources, and in influencing policymaking. Controversies in science, observes Dorothy Nelkin, a sociologist of science,"are struggles over meaning and morality, over the distribution of resources, and over the locus of power and control" (Nelkin 1995) .
Discussions of risk have been cited as hybrids of science and societal concerns. Paul Slovic, a risk-perception researcher, has noted that "danger is real, but risk is socially constructed" (Slovic 1999, p. 699) . That is, despite the objective characteristics to risk (i.e., risk as a natural phenomenon), discussions about risk draw from a broad context of multiple frames of reference and an accompanying range of intentions:
Whoever controls the definition of risk controls the rational solution to the problem at hand. If you define risk one way, then one option will rise to the top as the most cost-effective or the safest or the best. If you define it another way, perhaps incorporating qualitative characteristics and other contextual factors, you will likely get a different ordering of your action solutions. Defining risk is thus an exercise in power. (Slovic 1999, p. 699) In such an environment, how can science be communicated with both integrity and social understanding? In partial answer to this question, we expand upon the three points with which we began this paper: acknowledging that communication is a process and not only a set of products, allowing for both scientific and personal knowledge as determinants of frames of reference, and anticipating that scientists and their findings and methods will continue to be, albeit reluctantly, social critics.
How can we acknowledge science communication as a process and not simply as a set of products? The communication process starts long before and continues long after an article, a press release, a professional meeting, or even a phone call. Our choices of which information to provide go beyond the simple binary decision of relevant or not relevant. Process, as a definitional guideline, reminds us that communication is a work in progress rather than a series of linear steps. A process orientation directs attention toward adaptation and adjustment. In this view, communication involves negotiation of meanings. This means that a single statement of fact offered to a group with multiple frames of reference will rarely be enough. Questions and qualifications will abound. Thus, dialogue in some form is the primary trait of a communication process.
Often, the process involves combinations and permutations of a handful of sensitive areas in a problem-fact-solution framework. Look for discussions about (1) the definition of problems or challenges (whether scientific or social), (2) descriptions and illustrations of natural processes, (3) possible future approaches to scientific and social challenges, and (4) lines of responsibility for continuing and future scientific work. We observe that each of these is an area for negotiated meanings. For instance, a toxicological view of an event in which workers were exposed to carbon tetrachloride may well differ from the workers' view of the problem, which could focus on engineered features of the facility or on managerial habits. Thus, the problem for the worker may be considerably more complex and inclusive than for an investigating specialist. A regulator's view of the same event would include still another set of factors.
For practical purposes, then, process means dialogue, which in turn means at least two forms of restatement: verbatim restatement (repetition) and revision (taking a different perspective). Repetition is often necessary for information that is new because we must put the new information into some cognitive outline that includes familiar information. Before offering information that may be new to others, then, it is helpful to decide which keywords or concepts are important to repeat and, of course, define and illustrate. These should be returned to later in the hope that others will take away a few memorable bits despite the fuller explanations being left behind.
Revision means assimilating and accommodating others' frames of reference. This assumes, of course, that we listen to others' restatements, questions, and simplistic or wrong interpretations of what we see in the topic at hand. Then, we "resee" (revise) our information from their viewpoint and adjust accordingly. This approach probably most clearly engages us in negotiating meanings. These phenomena show that negotiating our way to a common frame of reference is no trivial matter. Moreover, dialogue on complex matters between experts and nonexperts may seem to result in blank common frames or frames filled with a meager metaphor or two that would never pass the test of validity among scientific colleagues. However, scientific integrity is not compromised by responsible interpretation and negotiation of meanings.
How can we balance personal knowledge and expert knowledge? Whenever possible, address variables that are of interest to nonexperts when presenting to nonexperts. Start by identifying those people to whom scientific information might be relevant and applicable. Will the sequencing of a particular gene be of interest only to entomologists, or might others, such as farmers, reasonably have an interest? Interest, it should be noted, is not the same as alarm. Our task is to avert others' surprise-or to share with them our own. Explain how the variables you are discussing may relate to other, less obvious variables. It is a useful technique to confirm others in some of their prior knowledge first and only then to introduce new or disconfirming information, rather than vice versa.
Resist stereotyping nonexpert opinion. While others may not share your expertise, they vary widely in what they do know. Such a habit leads to the paradigm frame of reference fallacy, i.e., the belief that those without your knowledge all share the same frame of reference. During one of our focus groups that consisted primarily of nonscientists, the facilitator, who represented a scientific organization, prefaced the meeting by listing what other focus groups had said about the topics at hand. While this was well intentioned, the net effect was to lead the conversations in pre-formed directions. Analysis of the transcripts revealed that his words were prescient. That focus group, as distinguished from others, offered no fresh insights and appeared reluctant to violate the expectations implied by his introduction. Similarly, parents who suspect that a school building is "sick" and is making their children sick may well take their children out of that school, not because they do not understand the scientific studies that found no toxins in the building but because they are acting prudently. It would be incorrect, then, to conclude that their behavior is evidence that nonscientists fail to understand science or risk assessments.
Acknowledge that science is, by nature, provisional knowledge: "It is surely much better for scientists to acknowledge this so that the public and their representatives can make the best use of what information is available, from whatever source" (Gregory and Miller 1998, p. 248) . One seasoned science writer, Victor Cohn, suggests a short list of questions that scientists should be ready to answer (Cohn 1997 ):
• How do you know? Are you just telling us something you "know" or have "observed" or "found to be true"? Or have you done or found any studies or experiments?
• What are your data? Your numbers? How or where did you get them?
• How sure can you be about them? Are there any possible flaws or problems in your conclusions? Salespeople are sure. Honest investigators admit uncertainties.
• How valid are your conclusions? In science, this means are your numbers and conclusions accurate?
• How reliable are your results? That is, how reproducible are your results? Have they been fairly consistent from study to study?
• What is your degree of certainty or uncertainty by accepted tests?
• Who disagrees with you? Why?
How do we deal with the nonneutral social role of scientific findings or methods? Although objectivity is not neutrality, scientific information can, and should, be offered in a spirit of concern for the common good. This spirit may come through in the tone of a speaker or writer, i.e., that person's attitude to the listeners or readers, to the subject, and to themselves, as perceived by others. Offer no information that you are not willing to explain. Examples chosen for nonexperts should suggest to them that their frames of reference are being considered. In presenting selected data to an audience wider than your scientific colleagues, choose at least some variables of interest to the wider audience. Annotate important steps or data points that may be of interest to nonexperts as well as those that are interesting scientifically. Because public concerns about science are not limited to science itself but encompass institutional and political concerns, the public is interested in institutional decisions about which work is pursued and which is not, in the organizational pressures on scientists, and in factors important in pursuing good science. Scientists should be ready to address these issues as well as those that are strictly scientific to lead a conversation that is truly a dialogue. This does not mean recapitulating an organizational hierarchy or project history in place of science. It does mean, however, revealing funding sources and their involvement and interest in the research, discussing factors in any decisions potentially related to the research, and identifying the real decisionmakers.
Scientific perspectives are indispensable to public dialogue and policymaking. Scientists can raise public awareness of critical issues and improve the level of public debate. However, scientists do not stand above the process of negotiating meanings or creating constructive public dialogue. This requires acknowledging and working with the often-implicit assumptions that block understanding of science by those less informed and becoming more cognizant of the interpenetration of public and scientific understandings.
